The emergence of new mobile and wireless networks, with novel capabilities, offers opportunities to widen traditional internet-based applications. In this paper, we focus on a famous and widely used e-commerce application: auctions, and propose their deployment over ad hoc networks. Actually, we specify here this auction model while assuring identified crucial requirements: security and fairness. Security services are provided through threshold cryptography mechanisms whereas fairness is provided through rounds duration calculation. We prove that such a novel mobile commerce application presents advantages with regard to conventional economic models. Evaluations present optimistic results promising a realisable deployment of our auction model. Keywords: mobile commerce; auctions; ad hoc networks; threshold cryptography; security; fairness; electronic business.
Introduction
In recent times, new mobile and wireless networks types emerged, offering novel and interesting capabilities. Among them, ad hoc networks represent an immediate example. In fact, such networks do not need any infrastructure or management entity. Ad hoc networks are characterised by their completely autonomous, dynamic, auto-organised and ubiquitous nature. They allow a group of persons to communicate in a spontaneous way, anywhere and at anytime, while being free to join and to leave the network at any time. The most attractive economic benefit is obviously the low cost of this communicating infrastructure and of its management. Auctions gains would be considerably increased since auction management fees would considerably decrease.
Faced with such capabilities, we believe that their exploitation would allow the development of innovative distributed applications; with more of them and widened possibilities in the range of existing ones. In this paper, we propose to deploy auctions over ad hoc networks, proving that we would have many benefits to gain from such an m-commerce application.
Until now, auctions have represented an internet-based e-commerce application, and have acquired through recent years a significant part of the e-commerce market. Internet based auctions have been, meanwhile, rapidly diversified into various products. The most famous auction sites are: eBay (E-Bay Home Page, 1995 -2007 for a wide range of products, CNET (CNET Home Page, 2007) for electronic goods, Priceline (Priceline Home Page, 1998 -2007 for airline tickets, and E*Trade (Etrade Home Page, 2006 -2007 for financial products (Ezhilchelvan and Morgan, 2001) . Currently, we live in a mobility era where people have become more and more mobile, and accomplish a multitude of tasks. Indeed, users are usually provided with sophisticated wireless terminals in order to be always connected and therefore to consult their e-mails, to work remotely with their companies, to surf the World Wide Web, or to make e-commerce transactions.
We, therefore, investigate ways to provide a mobile form of auction in order to offer new opportunities to mobile people. Hence, we bet on ad hoc networks to support a new way to perform auctions. In this case, the auction process can be created anywhere and as soon as a group of at least three persons agree to participate in the auction. One of them announces goods for sale or for purchase. The others represent competing bidders that must relay on a secure exchange scheme and that must have an equally fair chance for submitting a successful bid. In this manner, we could imagine a large number of auction scenarios; for example, in an airport a group of persons form a spontaneously an ad hoc network and participate in an auction to buy a last minute ticket. For the seller and for the buyer, the auction costs are negligible since there is no need for a manager for the networking infrastructure, or for the auction operation. The whole system is entirely autonomous and auto-organised.
In this paper, we propose a fully distributed, secure and fair architecture for deploying auctions over ad hoc networks and operating according to English auctions bidding rules. English auctions are actually the mostly deployed auction category (Pinker et al., 2003) and present simple bidding rules. Nevertheless, any other auction type could, in the same way, be deployed over ad hoc networks. We first present a general overview of auctions. Then, we express our approach deploying auctions over ad hoc networks and its advantages. Next, we discuss problems related to auctions in general and to auctions over ad hoc networks in particular. We particularly emphasise the requirements generated from the specific case where auctions are deployed over ad hoc networks. Later, we expose the design of our solution and the mechanisms it is based on. We finally conclude the paper and give our perspectives for future works.
Deploying auctions over ad hoc networks

Auctions overview
Auctions were characterised in the standard definition expressed by McAfee and McMillan (1987) as the following:
"An auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants." (Wurman et al., 1998) Meanwhile, auctions have been classified into different types according to criteria defining, essentially, the time of bidding, the bids value and the winner(s) price value (Boyd and Mao, 2000) . The commonly used auction types are the open-cry auctions also called 'English auctions', the single and multiple round sealed bid auctions and the Dutch auctions (Kumar and Feldman, 1998a) .
Additionally, auctions usually rely on a central auction server, called the auctioneer. The auctioneer represents the core functionality of bids processing and is responsible for the management of the auction process and of the submitted bids. Its tasks are often defined and formulated in the literature (Ezhilchelvan and Morgan, 2001; Rachlevsky-Reich et al., 1999; Wurman et al., 1998) . We summarise the auctioneer's functionalities in the four following main points:
• displaying the information about the auction details, such as the bidding deadline, the highest placed bid, etc.
• verifying the authenticity and the timeliness of incoming bids
• evaluating bids submitted in each round
• announcing the highest bid.
The system architecture
In our auctions design, we remove the entity, 'the auctioneer'. Its services are carried out by the different participating bidders. This choice results from the mobile context. In fact, as ad hoc networks represent the support network of the proposed auction application, distributing the auctioneering activity would better suit these network characteristics such as their dynamic, ubiquitous, spontaneous and autonomous nature. Consequently, a group of persons who aim to form a spontaneous auction application may establish an ad hoc network in an autonomous way, connect with each other and begin the auction process. Ad hoc users must, indeed, be free to join and to leave the network at any time. Additionally, we observe significant advantages by removing the auctioneer and distributing its tasks on the different participating nodes:
• We avoid the possible case where the auctioneer could become non-connected to the network and so, to the participating nodes. Such a case could cause the inhibition of the auction application as we rely in our model on English auctions where the auctioneer represents a fundamental actor in the operation of the application.
• We also avoid many security vulnerabilities. Security requirements generated by the ad hoc context will be treated in the last section. However, many efforts had already pointed in the literature towards removing the auctioneer from different auction models, essentially for security concerns. In the next section, we throw some lights upon previous researchers' motivations for doing away with the auctioneer.
Related works on removing the auctioneer from auction models
As mentioned before, auction systems traditionally rely on a central server called the auctioneer. The presence of such a centralised server at the core of the auction process has been often criticised. Ezhilchelvan and Morgan (2001) had proposed the distribution of auctioneer services for scalability concerns, i.e., to be capable of providing its end users with satisfactory Quality of Service (QoS), regardless of the number of users and their geographical distance. They proved that a centralised approach could be very restrictive since too many users can overload the server, making the whole auction process less responsive than the sellers and buyers would prefer. The distribution of the auctioneer is supported in Rachlevsky-Reich et al. (1999) where the authors announce that a centralised approach can not effectively deal with the autonomy of local markets: national markets may employ their own rules, monetary regulations, payment procedures, etc. Given that the auction system would be used by bidders from different parts of the world with diverse market procedures and customs, it must be designed to cater for variations in market mechanisms. These autonomy considerations make decentralisation in system design, and therefore, of the auctioneer, not just a desirable option but also an absolute practical requirement. Brandt (2002) proposes an auction application without auctioneer at all in order to provide the maximal security level to the application. The paper shows that there are many possibilities for the auctioneer to cheat whether in a regular first-price auction or a Vickrey auction, as he has to announce the selling price at the end of the auction. In a regular first-price auction for example, the auctioneer has to announce the selling price at the end of the auction. He could declare a price greater than the highest bid, in order to keep the goods if he thinks the bids are not high enough. No bidder would be able to discover this form of deception. In a second-price auction (Vickrey auction), the winner has doubts about whether the price the auctioneer tells him to pay is actually the second-highest bid. In fact, the auctioneer could easily make up a 'second-highest' bid to increase his revenue. In addition to a possibly insincere auctioneer, bidders in all sealed-bid auctions have to reveal their bids to the auctioneer. There are numerous ways to misuse these values by giving them away to other bidders or to the seller. It remains in the hands of the auctioneer to determine whether the auction really is a sealed-bid auction. The protocol proposed in this paper removes crucial weaknesses of the Vickrey auction by distributing the auctioneer. The calculation of the selling price would be done on the bidders themselves. However, this solution could not be applied in reality because until now it takes hours, if not days, to decide auctions with a high number of bidders.
Operation of auctions over ad hoc networks
Scenarios
An auction application over an ad hoc network can take place as soon as a group of persons are gathered in a limited space, and agree to participate in the auction. Hence, there is no need for any infrastructure, or for any specific external entity, to manage the system as we propose a completely auto-organised and autonomous auction scheme. Such conditions are actually advantageous for situations where a number of persons gather in places where no infrastructure is envisaged, and where they could be interested in the establishment of a spontaneous auction application. For example, in the waiting room of an airport a spontaneous auction could be created to sell a last available ticket or to buy an available ticket.
Another interesting exploitation case of this scheme could be the traditional auction rooms in art galleries. By communicating through an ad hoc network, participants can keep their anonymity, which represents a desirable requirement in auction applications, as expressed by Boyd and Mao (2000) .
Assumptions
The following assumptions are necessary for the auction operation:
• The auction application is running on the wireless terminals of the participating bidders, an ad hoc routing protocol to enable the creation of a spontaneous ad hoc network. In our work, we use the Optimised Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol (Clausen et al., 2003) as ad hoc routing protocol because of its proactive nature allowing a continuous update of routes.
• The system connectivity must be preserved during the auction. For that, we assume:
• Any node in the network has at least one physical connection with one other node already connected to the network.
• Any node present in the network, even it does not participate in the auction, must relay auction messages (bids).
Operation
Our auctions model respects the bidding rules of English auctions, especially rules that manage the beginning and the end of submitting a valid bid. It operates according to the following actions:
• As in English auctions, the total time of our auction application is divided into rounds, where a round delimits the time for placing bids. Yet, instead of the auctioneer, a participant node which has a goods to sell, initiates the auction application by sending an initial price, also called the quoted price. This initial price is usually the minimum price acceptable to the seller. It is flooded in the entire network in a message containing the number and the duration of rounds. The duration of rounds is an important parameter in our model. We prove in Section 4.4 that rounds must have a minimal duration in order to ensure bidding fairness which represents a crucial requirement for auctions application. This duration is the same for all participants.
• The first round begins for each bidder as soon as he receives the initiator's quoted price. After that, each bidder submits his bid and collects the bids of the other participants during the round. The processing task of bids is also achieved by the bidders themselves and not by the auctioneer as in conventional schemes. In fact, bids are flooded to all network nodes, and therefore each node can calculate at the end of the round the highest bid. Consequently, he chooses to increase or not his bid during the next round. If not, he leaves the application. All participants must submit a bid during the first round, otherwise they are considered uninterested by the auction. However, they must relay the bids of the other participating nodes as long as they belong to the network.
• At the end of the auction time, i.e., during the last round, the bidder who has proposed the highest bid, wins. The transaction settlement occurs then between the seller and the winner by exchanging unicast (point to point) messages.
In Figure 1 , we illustrate a basic bidding scenario of our auctions model. In this scenario, the auction duration is equal to three rounds, and there are two bidders E1 and E2 in addition to the initiator I. This scenario shows that the auction's first round begins at different moments for E1 and E2. This is due to the fact that the distance separating both bidders from the initiator is not the same, and implies that E1 receives the quoted price before E2. The auction duration is then divided in rounds of equal duration, but shifted in time. Consequently, E1 starts first the bidding activity since he receives the first bid before E2. During each round, E1 and E2 submit their bids and collect each other's bids. At the third round (the last round), E1 decides to not bid. Therefore, E2 wins and ends the application with the initiator by exchanging unicast messages. 
Problems and requirements of auctions over ad hoc networks
Auctions problems and requirements have often been defined in literature (Ezhilchelvan and Morgan, 2001; Kumar and Feldman, 1998b; Naor et al., 1999; Herschlag and Zwick, 2000; Boyd and Mao, 2000; Lin and Shrivastava, 2003; Ben Ayed et al., 2004) . In this section, we recall the general requirements of auctions and then those implied by the deployment of auctions over ad hoc networks. The most important are the security of bids and the fairness of the bidding process.
Security
The security problem in auctions had often been raised. Various studies have identified general security requirements for auction systems such as protection against denial of service attacks and against spurious bids (Kumar and Feldman, 1998b; Panzini and Shrivastava, 1999) . These security services may be required for both the bidder/initiator and auctioneer. We first address the security requirements related to internet-based auctions and then those identified for auctions deployed over ad hoc networks.
Case of internet-based auctions
• Identification and authentication. To participate in an auction, a bidder or an initiator must be authenticated. This would permit unauthorised posting of bids and violation of auction rules to be prevented. In fact, in current internet-based auctions, security problems may be due to abuses of bids treatment and also to the centralised management of the auctions process by the auctioneer, on which total trust is placed.
Bid shielding, siphoning, shilling and sniping are risks due to attacks on bids treatment with, sometimes, the complicity of the auctioneer (Boyd and Mao, 2000) . Brandt (2002) defines the different forms of auctioneer misbehaviours. For example, in a regular first-price auction, the auctioneer could declare a price greater than the highest bid in order to keep the goods if he thinks the bids are not high enough. In addition to a possibly insincere auctioneer, bidders in English auctions have to reveal their bids to the auctioneer. There are numerous ways to misuse these values by giving them away to other bidders or the seller.
• Non-repudiation of the auctioneer and of the bidders. This service permits to prevent the auctioneer or a bidder denying having submitted a bid (Omote, 2002) . He can not then refuse to pay if he is the winner.
• Anonymity. It is required when bidders should not know one another's identity from the exchange of information.
• Bids integrity. It allows a participant to be sure that a received message had not been modified during transmission. The bid confidentiality service may also be required when submitted bids should not be accessible to unauthorised participants (Harkavy et al., 1998) .
Case of auctions deployed over ad hoc networks
In the context of ad hoc networks, bidders act as routers. Hence, they have to forward the received bids to the other competitor bidders. If bids are not protected, a dishonest bidder can easily modify the bid value of a rival bidder while forwarding it to the other participants. Because of the absence of central management entities in ad hoc networks, a bid's integrity becomes a particularly crucial security requirement in such a communication context. In the other auction types, this requirement is not as important because bids are sent to the auctioneer who has to flood them to bidders. The integrity of bids relies in this case on the only integrity of the auctioneer. In the present work, we only focus on the integrity of bids since it represents the specific security requirement implied by the deployment of auctions over ad hoc networks. Nevertheless, the other mentioned security requirements, e.g., non-repudiation and authentication of participants, still as important security requirements in the case of deploying auctions over ad hoc networks.
Fairness
Case of internet-based auctions
Fairness is a big challenge concerning all auction types. It means that all participants should be treated equally, i.e., every bidder should have an equally fair chance for submitting a successful bid (Ezhilchelvan and Morgan, 2001) . For the bidders, fairness means that all the participants involved in an auction process have the same privilege with regard to communications in bidding or in receiving other messages from the auctioneer. For the initiator, fairness means that all sellers have equal opportunities to place and process their demands of posting goods and creating auctions (Panzini and Shrivastava, 1999; Asokan, 1998) . Several studies considered fairness as an optional requirement of internet auctions (Panzini and Shrivastava, 1999) .
More generally, fairness concerns essentially the bidding process and imposes that (Boyd and Mao, 2000 ):
• no bidder should have more information than any other to determine their bid
• all submitted bids during a round should be evaluated during the same round
• the bidder sending the highest bid should win the auction
• the auction winner must pay, as determined by the predefined published rules.
Case of auctions deployed over ad hoc networks
When auctions are deployed over ad hoc networks, fairness becomes a much more important requirement because bidders are, at the same time, routers and end nodes. Consequently, intermediary bidders can receive bids and react before the other bidders. This can be an advantage for some participants compared to others according to their distance to the initiator (seller). Thus, if fairness is not provided, a 1-hop distance bidder to the initiator will receive the quoted price before a 2-hop distance bidder or a 3-hop distance bidder, and then will respond in shorter time and may finally win the auction. This situation can easily occur. We illustrate it in Figure 2 . To summarise, the reasons making auction fairness especially required in the ad hoc context are:
• Absence of infrastructure, and therefore of centralised entity in ad hoc networks. Nodes are responsible for routing messages in the network.
• Ad hoc networks have dynamic topology, which implies that some bidders have smaller distance to the initiator than others. Those nodes would be privileged to receive the quoted price and then to send their offer earlier than bidders having longer distance to the initiator.
• Nodes synchronisation is not possible in ad hoc networks because of wireless links. The initiator can not estimate the necessary time for exchanging messages with each participating node of the network.
In the next section, we propose a fairness mechanism allowing the different participants of an auction deployed over an ad hoc network to have knowledge of all the other submitted bids in order to react suitably in consequence, i.e., to increase, or not, their bids.
The ad hoc auction implementation design
The solution we propose presents mechanisms assuring the identified requirements of our auctions design: the integrity of bids during their transmission and the fairness of bidding. As ad hoc networks are based on routing protocols, we choose the OLSR protocol as the routing protocol support, and benefit from its optimised flooding mechanism to broadcast bids in the network. In Fourati and Al Agha (2006), we have proposed a secure version of the OLSR routing protocol based on threshold cryptography. We base our auction scheme on this secure routing protocol in order to have reliable routes in the network. In Figure 3 , we illustrate through the different layers of the proposed auction model, the involved protocols and mechanisms providing the identified requirements of the application. In the following, we first give an overview of the OLSR protocol and of threshold cryptography principles. We finally present the security and the fairness mechanisms of the proposed auction system.
The Optimised Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol
The OLSR protocol is a proactive, link state routing protocol, which was developed for ad hoc networks. Since its standardisation in October 2003, the protocol has aroused increasing interest in research and military domains. Its proactive nature implies that routes are continually maintained up-to-date, such that when a node makes a request for sending a message, an optimal route is already available. In addition, the availability of connectivity information, i.e., the declaration of the nature of links between neighbours, which characterises link state protocols, is fully re-examined and optimised in the OLSR protocol.
The OLSR robustness and popularity are mainly due to its MultiPoint Relays (MPR) principle. The objective of MPR is the optimisation of the control traffic flooding (Clausen et al., 2003) . In the OLSR protocol, the construction of routing tables is achieved through periodic Topology Control (TC) messages which must be flooded to all network nodes. MPRs are chosen such that emitted flooding messages (TC messages), when relayed by the MPR set, must reach all 2-hop neighbours. The MPR set of a node n, noted by MPR(n), represents, in other terms, the smallest subset of symmetric 1-hop neighbours of n, having symmetric links with all 2-hop neighbours of n. The MPR flooding mechanism conducts to the elimination of duplicate transmission and to the minimisation of duplicate reception. Indeed, MPRs significantly minimise the control traffic in terms of packet length and control messages number, and in parallel optimise the bandwidth use. Furthermore, the OLSR protocol is well adapted in an important mobility context. Figure 4 illustrates saved control messages when they are flooded by MPRs. In previous works (Fourati and Al Agha, 2006) , we have proposed a security scheme for the OLSR protocol to provide the integrity of control messages. This scheme is based on threshold cryptography. We have proved that threshold mechanisms are well suited to ad hoc network characteristics. Hence, our security scheme for auctions over ad hoc networks will be inspired by this previous work and will be based on the threshold cryptography.
Threshold cryptography principles
In classic cryptography, a private key is secretly held by a user and must never be revealed; otherwise, the security system would not be reliable. In contrast, in threshold cryptography, the secret is shared between several network nodes in such a way that no single node can deduce the secret without knowing all shares. The main benefit in using threshold cryptography is to ensure security services by employing encryption without keeping the secret at only one holder, which could be easily compromised.
The idea of Shamir's (k, n) threshold system is to share a secret key between n parties (Shamir, 1979) . Each group of any k participants (share holders), can cooperate to reconstruct the shares and recover the secret. On the other hand, no group of k -1 participants can get any information about the secret.
The interest we have in this technique when conceiving a securing solution for the ad hoc routing resides in its flexibility. In fact, independently of the fact that Shamir's scheme is perfectly secure, it presents many characteristics fitting the dynamic ad hoc context. The most important are the following:
• the number of shares n could be increased and new shares could be added without affecting the other shares
• existing shares can be removed without affecting other shares, as long as the share is really destroyed
• it is possible to replace all the shares (or even k) without changing the secret and without revealing any information on the secret by selecting new shares holders
• some parties can be given more than one share.
As threshold cryptography characteristics are well suited to ad hoc routing protocols nature, many previous securing algorithms were based on them to propose distributed key schemes. Nevertheless, most of them need an external intervention to initialise the security system, e.g., for the initial distribution of key shares (Zhou and Haas, 1999; Kong et al., 2001) . In our solution, we avoid any external intervention to respect, as well as possible, the autonomous nature of ad hoc networks, and to allow the spontaneous creation of applications over these networks.
The secure auction protocol
As mentioned in the previous section, the securing algorithm we propose here is based on a securing algorithm for the OLSR (Fourati and Al Agha, 2006) . By doing so, we are first sure to rely on a secured communication architecture for our auction application. Second, we exploit the routing layer security mechanisms to provide security services to the application layer, i.e., the integrity of bids. The algorithm consists in the sharing of the source node's private key in order to avoid the compromising of the secret. The algorithm operation is the following:
• Each node generates a pair of secret/public keys to sign its emitted routing messages. As soon as he joins the ad hoc network, he has to flood its public key to announce its arrival and to allow the other bidders to decrypt its signature. As we use the OLSR protocol as routing protocol, we flood public keys by the MPR flooding mechanism in order to minimise the traffic.
• To ensure bid integrity, the signature process operates exactly in the same way as in the routing layer, i.e., as for securing the OLSR protocol (Fourati and Al Agha, 2006 ).
• The bidder (source node emitting bids) first shares its secret with n 1-hop neighbours selected according to their trust level. Different trust level algorithms have been already defined (Makhuntot and Phonphoem, 2003) , and are out of the scope of this work.
• Afterwards, the bidder sends to the n selected trusted 1-hop neighbours its bid in unicast messages encrypted with their respective public keys. Once shares are sent, the source node destroys its secret in order to avoid its being compromised.
• Each trusted neighbour (from the n selected neighbours) floods the received bid signed with its share of the source bidder's private key to all the network nodes (the other participants of the auction application).
• As we use a (k, n) threshold cryptography system, bidders must receive each rival bid only k times -signed with k different shares-in order to recover the original bid signature and to verify it. Consequently, intermediate nodes (competitor bidders) can not modify the bids any more while forwarding them, unless they know the k shares of the secret.
The secured flooding of bids is illustrated in Figure 5 . We show in this figure how secured bids are flooded while relying on the MPR flooding mechanism. An originator bidder shares first its private key K S with four trusted 1-hop neighbours (N 1 , N 2 , N 3 and N 4 ). He then sends its bid in unicast messages encrypted with the respective public keys (K N1 , K N2 , K N3 and K N4 ) of the selected neighbours. Neighbours N 1 , N 2 , N 3 and N 4 , flood the received bid, signed with their respective shares (K S1 , K S2 , K S3 and K S4 ). To summarise the securing scheme, note that each bidder relies on n selected trusted 1-hop neighbours to sign its emitted bid and thus ensure its bid's integrity. Four steps are required:
• the source bidder generates by itself its signing private key and shares it into n shares
• the source node selects n trusted 1-hop neighbours according to their trust level, and then attributes to them the different shares of its private key
• the selected trusted neighbours sign with their respective shares the source bid and flood it in the network
• only k received bids signed with k different shares are necessary to recover the original bid.
The integrity of bids is ensured since at least k selected 1-hop neighbours are not compromised or do not act maliciously. If not, i.e., more than k signing neighbours are compromised, the consequence would be that the bid's original signature will not be correctly recovered and its integrity will not be verified. Nevertheless, the receiving bidders know that a problem has occurred, and in any case a compromised bid can be interpreted correctly. In this case, two possibilities could be envisaged. The first one is to reject any bid with non-recoverable signature, which damages the emitting bidder. The second possibility is to send an alert in order to ask for emitting the compromised bid a second time.
The described algorithm is completely distributed. Moreover, the system does not, at any time, need the intervention of any external entity, so it is completely distributed and auto-organised, fitting thus the ad hoc deployment characteristics. Finally, we use MPRs mechanisms for all flooded messages. Thus, the additional traffic required by the algorithm is minimised.
The fairness mechanism
To ensure a fair bidding process, we must provide all participant bidders an equal fair chance for submitting a successful bid. In our mobile auctions design, fairness is assured if the two following conditions are proved:
• At the initialisation of the auction, all network participants must have the possibility, as soon as they receive knowledge of the initial quoted price of the seller, to submit their bids during the first round.
• In the following rounds, all network participants must have enough time during the current round to The fairness problem, when based on ad hoc networks, is that the farthest bidder from the originator will always receive, recover bids and react later than the other bidders. This results in a lack of fairness with regard to bid submissions.
To resolve this problem, we propose a mechanism relying on the estimation of the necessary round duration time allowing the fulfilment of the defined fairness conditions. The round duration time is calculated on the basis of the worst case, i.e., the case allowing to the two farthest nodes of the network to receive bids from each other and to submit their bids consequently during the same current round. We show this approach in Figure 6 . If we consider that the first round of the auction is engaged at the time each bidder receives the first bid, then the round must last long enough to allow the farthest bidder to receive the bid. Reciprocally, each bidder must receive during the same round the bid of the farthest bidder. In the Figure 6 , we consider that the bidder i and the bidder j are the farthest bidders in the network. To provide the bidding fairness, bidder i and bidder j must receive each other's bid during the same round even if their rounds are shifted in time. As a result, the bids are processed during the right rounds; simply shifted in time. Consequently, the maximum necessary round duration to provide fairness is the Round Trip Time (RTT) applied to the longest path in the network, i.e., the distance between the two farthest bidders in the network. We name this duration T Fairness , which we calculate as the following: 
with Maximal hops Number: The maximal hops number of the network, i.e., the OLSR partial graph diameter.
Time out: The maximal time of the retransmission of all allowed unsuccessful packets before giving up a message transmission.
The factor 2 refers to the RTT condition.
The last parameter (Time out) of equation (1) is depending on the MAC layer protocol. In ad hoc networks, communication between nodes relies on a specific physical interface. Basically, the communication interface tries to send information according to a scheduling mechanism. This mechanism resolves conflicts between different nodes that interfere between each other. When the scheduling is not possible because of a high load of transmission, the packet will be dropped. The Time out represents the maximum time that a physical interface must wait before dropping the packet when transmission is delayed because of interference. From equation (1), T Fairness is the multiplication of the maximum time on one hop (Time out) and the maximum hop in the network. In the case of Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11b) which represents the more popular physical interface for ad hoc networks, this Time out can be calculated according to specification parameters of the standard (IEEE Standards, 1999) .
Equation (2) shows that the Time out is the result of the summation of constants (DIFS, SIFS, T ACK , T Tdata ) and a random number x of slot times. According to the index of the attempt (i), x can take a value between [31, Y] , where Y varies between 63 and 1023. 
In equation (3), the maximal hops number is easily calculable with the Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm, which is usually used in the OLSR protocol to optimise hop number.
The final calculation result of T Fairness shows that the maximum necessary round duration for assuring fairness is about 0.9 × the maximal hop number of the network. It will depend then on the network density. This would be especially necessary if human participants are acting in the application instead of mobile agents. In this case, during a round, bidders should not only receive the bids of the other bidders, but should also have enough time to think about their bidding strategy and to react consequently, i.e., to possibly submit a higher bid.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a novel model of a famous mobile commerce application: auctions deployed over ad hoc networks. We have proved that such networks suit the auctions rules well. Furthermore, deploying auctions over ad hoc networks offer new opportunities and advantages to the auction market. In fact, this model shows that it is possible to perform auctions with zero cost for both buyer and seller. In this specific mobile context, we have defined appropriate mechanisms in order to respect English auction rules with regard to ad hoc network constraints. Ad hoc networks actually imply requirements for the correct operation of auctions. The proposed mechanisms provide the integrity of bids transmission by using threshold cryptography techniques and fair processing of bids by calculating the necessary fair round duration T Fairness . However, problems related to ad hoc terminal's limitations, e.g., energy consumption, breakdown tolerance, are not considered. Only requirements related to auction operation were studied.
Moreover, some specific security issues to ad hoc networks were not treated in the present work. For example, selfishness attacks could have significant consequences on the mobile auctions operation. In fact, as the network participating nodes have to rely on their concurrent bids, a dishonest node can omit to forward winner bids, and by doing so alter the whole auction process and results. We plan to consider these vulnerabilities in future works.
The present work intends to propose an auction model allowing correct operation of the auction application while considering constraints and vulnerabilities implied in the special context of a communicating infrastructure.
